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Abstract 
Short selling has had a very controversial existence. Bear raids and short and distort 
schemes tend to be the extent of the typical investors knowledge of short selling. Negative 
public opinion toward short-sellers ebbs and wanes as the market falls and rises. However, at 
best short sellers act unnoticed and during the worst times they become pariahs for the 
negative effects of down markets. Unbiased information about short selling is rare. This 
paper looks to uncover the truth behind short selling and serve as a counter to the negative 
public opinion of short selling. 
Several academic journal studies on short selling are examined to determine whether 
or increases in short interest volume precludes a down market or visa versa. Also examined 
in detail are the effects of regulation on short selling. Results from the academic studies are 
mixed; however, most studies lean toward the idea that short interest volume has no effect on 
the market. A few conclude that down markets tend to follow short interest. Only one 
concluded in favor of increases in short interest precluding a bull market. 
This study of NASDAQ technology stocks examines whether or not the release of 
short interest information triggers reaction in the prices of technology stocks. This reaction is 
measured in three tests involving, independently: short interest volume, short interest ratios 
and market value. These tests answer the question: is the level of short interest volume a 
predictor of future returns in technology stocks? 
Three conclusions are drawn from the study. First, on the day prior to the release of 
short interest information, NASDAQ technology stocks generate unexpected positive returns, 
and on the date ofthe release ofthe. short interest information and the following day 
unexpected negative abnormal returns are generated. 
Second, short interest volume appeared to predict future abnormal returns. The short 
interest ratio failed to be a predictor of abnormal returns. Abnormal returns appear again 
when market value is used as the determining variable. 
Third, some conclusions can be drawn about the pattern that appears in the market 
value study. It appears that the market processes negative information about stocks with the 
largest market value over the short-term, in the day following an announcement of short 
interest. However, it appears that negative information takes longer to process for stocks of 
mid-to-large market value. 
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"I'm a trader, not a short-seller" - John Fiero l , head of the Fiero Brothers, 
a firm recently expelled from NASD for fraudulent short selling, extortion 
and manipulation of the securities markets.2 
"(Short seller?) I don't like the name. I consider myself more of an 
accounting critic." - David Tree, manager of the Prudent Bear Fund? 
Introduction 
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Short selling has been around as long as there have been markets and has had a 
very controversial existence. Most casual investors do not practice short selling because 
ofthe tremendous costs involved; however, short selling still is practiced by an elite few 
and it remains a source of controversy. 
Negative public opinion toward short-sellers ebbs and wanes as the market falls 
and rises. In periods of stable markets, the short seller is able to conduct his activities 
relatively unnoticed by the public. However, in times of falling markets, short sellers 
become pariahs, accused of depressing stocks through market manipulation and the force 
of will. 
Immediately after the September 11 th 2001 attacks on the world trade center 
towers, the SEC began looking at short-selling activity for impropriety. It was found that 
there was an abnormal buildup in the short interest of airline, cruise line and hotel chain 
stocks prior to the attacks. Short interest is the number of shares sold short in a market or 
of a certain issue of stock. It was suspected that those who knew about the imminent 
attacks on the World Trade Center had planned on profiting on the suffering of business 
associated with travel because of the fear that the attacks created in travelers. The SEC 
and FTC immediately started looking into those who shorted the 30 or so stocks in 
question, searching for a connection between the short-sellers and the terrorists. After 
months of searching, the SEC and FTC had nothing to report on. It seems the build-up of 
I Weiss, "The Secret World of Short Sellers" Business Week (August 5th, 1996) Online. 
www.businessweek.com. March 1, 2001. 
2 Condon, Nancy. "NASD Regulation Bars John Fiero, expels Fiero Brothers, Inc., and imposes $1 million 
fine for illegal short sales, market manipulation and extortion. Online. 
http://www.nasdr.com/news/pr2001/ne sectionOl 003.html. January 8, 2001. 
3 Brooker. People. Fortune, April 4, 2002. vol 145 - 5. pg 34. 
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short interest was a result of pessimism due to weakening in the overall market, and the 
decreased amount of expendable income that would be available for traveling activities as 
a result of higher unemployment. The short sellers were cleared of wrongdoing by the 
government, but their reputation in the public's eyes was once again greatly tarnished. 
Short selling is commonly seen as unpatriotic because the short-seller profits on a 
stock's drop in price. Public opinion says that short-sellers gain at the typical investor's 
expense, for the typical long investor loses when the short seller wins and vice-versa. 
The public sees the short seller as a cheerleader for bear markets and a proponent of other 
people's suffering. Are these the truths or just misperceptions? 
In the past 50 years ofthe study of finance, many have studied short selling. They 
attempt to identify the effect the short seller has on the market through his actions. They 
look to determine his motives and the factors that make him commit to selling short. 
They also look at short selling regulation and how it has affected the operation of the 
financial markets. This paper will look at short selling in depth. What is short selling? 
How is short selling regulated? How does short selling regulation affect the operation of 
the market? Do short-sellers operate unscrupulously? What effect does short selling 
have on the market? This paper examines these questions. 
Mechanics of Short Selling 
Fundamental short selling is a market transaction that occurs in reverse order of 
the typical long buy-sell transaction. Long investors purchase shares of stock on the open 
market, wait for a price increase and then sell their shares at a higher price than they 
bought it, thus profiting from the increase in price. Short-sellers, on the other hand, sell 
shares, wait for a price decrease, and then buy them back at a lower price, profiting from 
the decrease in price of the securities. 
How do short sellers sell stock that they do not own? Short sellers must borrow 
the stock that they wish to sell from another investor who owns the stock. Next, they sell 
the shares that they borrowed. Later they purchase shares (hopefully at a lower price 
than the price at which they sold them) to replace the borrowed shares. For example, 
Mike Thompson believes that the XXX Co. has a poor future. Mike believes that within 
a year XXX Co. will be bankrupt and the stock will be worthless. In order to capitalize 
on this premonition, Mike borrows 100 shares of XXX Co., now at $35 a share, from his 
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friend, Will Cagle. Will lets Mike borrow his shares of stock on the condition that Mike 
will return the 1000 shares of XXX Co. at Mike's convenience or when Will requests the 
return ofthe shares. Mike sells the borrowed shares to another investor, Wade 
Harrington. Mike collects $3,500 from Wade for the stock. A year later, Will has not 
requested his stock back and XXX Co. declares bankruptcy. Now, anyone can buy 
shares of XXX Co. on the market for $1 a share. Mike purchases 100 shares of XXX Co. 
for $1 a piece, at a total cost of $1 00, and delivers the shares to Will to replace the shares 
he has borrowed. Mike has a profit of $3,400 ($3,500 inflow - $100 outflow) on this 
series oftransactions. 
Of course, Wade is not too happy about investing in a stock that lost over 3000% 
of its value in a year and Will is probably banging his head against a wall for holding on 
to XXX Co.'s stock so long, but they both made a conscious choice to invest the 
particular way they did. This is an overly simplistic look at the mechanism of short 
selling, and when market makers, middlemen and regulators are added in the mix the 
process becomes more complicated. 
What would cause someone to want to short sell a stock. The easy answer is that 
if a stock has a dismal future or is over-valued, it is a good short sale target. However, 
there are other considerations that will be discussed in detail further in the paper but 
should be mentioned now. Portfolio theory and modem portfolio management has 
created a use for shorting stocks. Short sales can be used to hedge positions in securities 
other than the security being shorted. Sometimes short sellers will take opposite 
positions on two stocks in the same industry in a similar move called pairs trading. Also, 
arbitrageurs can short sell stocks to lock in profits when there is a price discrepancy in 
similar financial instruments, whether those be long positions in stocks, puts or calls or 
convertible bonds. Some people short stocks to defer the payment of capital gains tax to 
a later year but lock in a given price on the stock. This is commonly referred to as 
shorting against the box. 
The total number of shares shorted, or short interest, in a particular stock is 
measured by each of the exchanges and by NASDAQ for the over the counter market. 
These measurements are published monthly in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) around the 
22nd or 23rd of the month. Only positions of at least 1,380,000 shares shorted or with a 
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change of at least 580,000 shares from the previous month are published. On average, 
the short positions in a given firm do not exceed 0.5% of their total outstanding shares4• 
A popular measurement of short interest is short interest divided by total outstanding 
shares. This is called the short interest ratio. The short interest ratio is published along 
with short interest in the WSJ. The short interest published on the 22nd or 23rd is actually 
compiled on the 15th of each month by the exchanges. But, because settlement can take 
up to five trading days the actual date of event for published short interest is the 8t\ 9th or 
10th of each month. 
The simplistic example of short selling that was given earlier is missing a couple 
of key pieces. First, it was assumed that Mike could just borrow his shares directly from 
Will. A transaction like this does not normally occur. Mike would actually contact his 
broker, Jeff Williams, at Williams Brokerage House, and tell Jeff that he desired to sell 
100 shares of XXX Co. short. At this point Jeffwould check on the availability of XXX 
Co. shares for Mike by first checking in his customers' margin accounts for shares to 
borrow or his hard to borrow list for NASDAQ shares. Exchange rules (NYSE Rule 
440c.10 and NASD Rule 3370) require affirmative determination be made prior to 
execution of a short sale order that actual shares are available to borrow and can be 
delivered on the settlement date. NASD has approved the use by member firms of a hard 
to borrow list. If a firm's shares aren't listed among the hard to borrow shares, then their 
absence from the list will satisfy affirmative determination. 5 
If Will Cagle has his stock with Williams Brokerage House held in a margin 
account, Will has probably signed a document allowing Williams to store and use the 
actual paper shares of stock. The brokerage house can use Will's shares in any way they 
see fit as long as Will's position in the stock is not compromised. (A margin account 
allows Will to borrow from Williams in order to buy more shares than he can actually 
afford, or for which he wants to buy with his own money). Let's assume that Will has his 
shares in a margin account. Jeffwould then take the shares out of Will's account and sell 
them on the open market for Mike. 
4 Dechow et al: 86 
5 NASD Notice to Members 00-28 "SEC Approves Use OF Hard To Borrow List To Comply With The 
Affmnative Determination Requirement For Short Sales (Rule 3370). May 2000. 
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Jeff cannot just sell XXX Co. 's shares on the market whenever he wants. The 
NYSE, Amex and NASDAQ all have rules that state short sales can only be made on an 
uptick or an even uptick in a security's price. This regulation is a result of past practices 
by short sellers that created heavy downward pressure on a stock's price. Today, 
consecutive short sales can only be made a successively higher or successively the same 
prices. An uptick occurs when a stock's current bid price is higher as a result of a past 
transaction. An even uptick is when a transaction takes place and there is no change in 
the bid price of a security, but the last change in the bid price was an uptick. 
Getting back to the example, next, Jeff approaches a market specialist that deals 
in XXX Co. stock. Jeff sees that XXX Co.'s bid price is at $35 a share. This is higher 
than bid of the previous transaction of$34.50. Jeffnow executes the trade selling 100 
shares of XXX Co. stock to the specialist for $35 a share, and collecting $3,500. What 
would happen if$35 was not an uptick? Jeff could not legally make the sale. In this case 
he could place a market order with the specialist that says at the next uptick the trade 
should be executed. However, if the price continues to drop say all the way until $20 
dollars before there is another uptick, then Jeff would only be getting $2000 for the 100 
shares for Mike. This might not be what Mike wants. Jeff could also place a limit order 
that would allow him to execute the trade the next time the stock hits $35 dollars or 
higher on an uptick. However, the limit order may not ever be executable at the $35 or 
higher price. 
Assume that leffhas completed the transaction, and collected the $3,500, what 
now? Jeff now puts the $3,500 in Will's account as collateral for the stock that Mike 
borrowed. In the simple example, Mike was able to keep the money that Jeff collected 
However, as a result of SEC regulation, Mike cannot have use of the proceeds of his short 
sale. Mike will actually have to deposit 50% ofthe value ofthe shares sold as assurance 
that ifhis idea is wrong, and XXX Co.'s stock price rises, he will have the money to 
repurchase the shares for Will at a higher price. Mike not only doesn't have use of the 
proceeds of his short sale while it is open, but he is required to deposit 50% extra. Not 
being able to reinvest the funds of the sale and requiring to put 50% of the total of the 
amount of the sale into a margin account are the first two costs of short selling that we 
see. Both are costs are related to the opportunity cost of not being able to use the $5,250 
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($3,500 sale proceeds for collateral + $1,750 margin) for other purposes. These costs 
make the short position much different than being just the opposite ofthe long position. 
At the time of the sale, Mike has 150% of the funds tied up in his short position in XXX 
Co. that Will has in his long position. A saving grace for Mike is that he is allowed to 
use Treasury bills or other securities that he may already have invested or wishes to 
invest as margin for the 50% that he is required to invest. Therefore, he can still earn 
interest on the 50% margin, although he loses the freedom to reinvest the money in things 
other than cash, stock, bonds or treasury securities-things that he can keep in the margin 
account-until he closes his long position. For example, if Mike's money was better spent 
opening his own business or buying a car for his child, the 50% margin requirement 
would be a real cost to Mike, even though he may have invested the margin in income 
producing securities. The real costs ofthe 50% margin requirement are the opportunity 
costs of reinvestment. The opportunity cost ofthe margin requirement is minor 
compared to the costs of the restrictions on reinvestment ofthe proceeds of a short sale. 
Studies by Figlewski (1981) and Alexander (1997) show that the restriction on the 
reinvestment of short sale proceeds is the largest obstacle to efficient short selling. 
A third cost to Mike is that Jeffwill most likely request from Mike a fee for his 
services. He may ask for a percentage of the dollars invested and/or take the interest 
from investing the money that he is holding in Will's account as collateral. Jeff and 
Williams Brokerage House can choose to share with Mike the interest that he earns on 
the collateral. This is called a broker rebate. Informed short sellers negotiate a broker 
rebate for themselves from their broker. Usually, the percentage of the rebate is a few 
points less than what is actually earned on the funds invested so that the broker can keep 
some of the interest as a fee for himself. A broker rebate can help offset some ofthe 
costs of not being able to invest the collateral elsewhere. 
When the Jeffborrows stock from Will for Mike and sells it to Wade, two sets of 
the same shares of stock are created. Wade now holds the actual shares of XXX Co. and 
he is on record with XXX Co. as being a stockholder of 100 shares. What happened to 
Will's position? Will still owns shares in XXX Co.; however, the shares he owns are 
virtual shares. He no longer has the certificates in his name or account. Will owns shares 
by virtue of the fact that Mike is indebted to him to replace his shares. 
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What happens ifthere is a dividend? The short seller is required to support the 
stock that he created by borrowing. In this case, Mike is required to support the stock 
that Will virtually owns. If a dividend is declared and issued, Wade will receive a 
dividend from XXX Co. as he is the shareholder on record. Will must receive the 
dividend also. His dividend will come from Mike. Mike is required to issue a dividend 
to Will. This will come out of Mike's margin account. If Mike's margin falls below a 
certain level set by Williams Brokerage House (usually 30% of the value of the shares 
shorted), he will be required to put forth more margin in what is called a margin 
mainenance call. What if there is a stock dividend or split? Theoretically in a stock 
dividend or stock split, no value is created therefore the stock price will decline relative 
to the amount of the split so no compensation will be required to be made. 6 However, 
the market does not always follow theory, so sometimes a stock will automatically 
increase in value as a result ofthe split. Once again, Mike is required to compensate Will 
for what he is missing out on by not holding the stock certificates. Compensating the 
lender for dividends and splits is a fourth cost of selling short. 
In summary, a short sale is the opposite of a long sale. The short seller wishes to 
sell high then buy low. Regulation makes short selling more than just the opposite of 
long selling. Short selling regulation places significant costs on the short seller. Long 
sellers do not have to face many of these costs. First, the short seller does not have use of 
the proceeds of his sale until he closes his position. Second, he must put forth an 
additional 50% as margin on his position in case the price rises rather than declines. 
Third, he must pay the broker a fee for his services. Fourth, he must compensate the 
lender of the stock for any dividends that are declared and issued. These costs pose 
significant barriers to short sellers and are prohibitive so that only a privileged few can 
reasonably expect to participate in short selling. 
Regulation of Short Selling 
Short selling occurred in the early days of the stock market relatively uninhibited. 
Short selling was blamed for much of the chaos that caused the stock market crash of 
1929. After the crash, pressure was put on the government to regulate short selling. Bear 
6 Walker. Selling Short. John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York. 1991. pg. 78. 
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raids are one way that short sellers were able to take advantage of market mechanics and 
unfairly profit before the Securities Exchange Act. Bear raids are short selling induced 
price declines. Often bear raids were aided by naked short sales (discussed in the next 
section). As more short sales are made, more virtual shares of a stock are created, and 
therefore, the supply of the shares increases. As basic economic theory says, an increase 
in supply, with no change in demand can only result in the same or a lower price. Bear 
raiders make short sale after short sale in order to drive the price of a stock as low as it 
can go. Then the raiders cover their positions at the lowest price, thereby profiting from 
their short sales by virtue of the number of virtual shares they create. The newly formed 
SEC introduced controls on the exchanges to curb short selling abuses. The SEC wrote 
the several rules that pertain to short selling. Rule 3b-3 defines short selling as "any sale 
of a security which the seller does not own or any sale which is consummated by the 
delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the account of, the seller.,,7 
Rule 10a-l of the Securities Exchange Act created the uptick rule, which prohibits 
investors from selling a stock listed on an exchange short unless the stock's last trade was 
higher than the previous trade or at the same price as the previous trade but higher at the 
last significant price change. For example if the current trade price is $10 for a share of 
stock and the last price was $10, short sellers have to look to the next previous price fto 
satisfy the uptick rule. If the next previous price is $9, then the short seller can make a 
trade. If the next previous price is $11, the short seller cannot execute his trade. If the 
next previous price is $10, the short seller must check the next previous price for an 
uptick, and so on. Both the NYSE and NASDAQ have adopted their own rules with a 
similar effect, Rule 440B and NASD Rule 3350, respectively.8 
The SEC has outlined three objectives for the uptick rule. 
1. Allow relatively unrestricted short selling when a firm's stock is 
advancing. 
2. Prevent short selling of a firm's stock at successively lower prices. 
7 General Rules and Regulations promulgated under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: "Rule 3b-3-
Definition of "Short Sale"" The Securities Lawyer's Deskbook. Online. 
http://www .law. uc.edu/CCL/34 ActRls/rule3 b-3 .html. 
8 "Short Sale Restrictions" U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website. Online. 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/shortrestrict.htm. March, 2, 2002 
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3. Prevent short sellers from accelerating a declining market in a firm's stock 
by exhausting all bids at a given price level. 9 
A study done by Alexander and Peterson (1997) shows that the uptick rule seems 
to have an adverse effect on short selling in advancing markets. In advancing markets, 
short sales of stocks with a bid-ask spread of 118 during the study were executed at the 
bid only 13.1 % of the time. The other orders were either executed later as a limit order or 
cancelled. 1o Eighty-nine percent of short sell orders in 118 point markets could not be 
immediately executed because the minimum shortable price was greater than the bid 
price. 11 The study shows that the uptick rule delays or prohibits the execution of more 
than 90% of all short sale orders. In addition, only 74% of short sell market orders 
submitted on an uptick were executed while 99.4% of regular sale orders submitted on an 
uptick were executed. 12 These are examples of how Alexander and Peterson demonstrate 
that the uptick rule does not achieve it's first objective, that is to allow relatively 
unrestricted short seIling at advancing prices. 
Another interesting finding of Alexander and Peterson's study is that short sellers 
usually disregard tick status when placing a short sale order. 13 Short sellers are governed 
by the tick status in the execution oftheir trades, but they submit orders at ticks in both 
directions. 
NASDAQ adopted an uptick rule on its own accord. The Securities Exchange 
Act only governs the organized exchanges. Over-the-counter transactions are exempt 
from SEC regulations. When the SEC adopted 10a-l in the 1930's there was no way to 
monitor the over-the-counter market efficiently. NASDAQ did not adopt an uptick rule 
3350 until 1994.14 NASD adopted Rule 3350 in order to prevent short sellers from 
selling stocks on their system at consecutively lower prices. The uptick rule for 
NASDAQ prohibits NASD members from selling short in NASDAQ stocks at or below 
the inside best bid when the best bid is lower than the previous inside best bid for that 
stock. Originally there must have been a 1116 or higher uptick in order to short sell. 
9 Alexander: 91 
10 Ibid: 98 
II Ibid: 101 
12 Ibid: 102 
13 Ibid: 101 
14 Albert, Srnaby, and Robison: 28 
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NASDAQ updated rule 3350 in March of2001 to change the uptick increment to $.01 for 
decimalization. 15 During a down bid, short sales can only be executed at $.01 above the 
current best bid. The inside best bid is the highest bid by all market makers quoting a 
particular stock. 
SEC rule 10b-4 governs short selling and tender offers. All tender offers must be 
made on a long sale. Tender offers mostly occur during takeover bids-hostile or friendly. 
Usually, the person or entity who wishes to takeover another company will offer to buy 
the shares of the target company at a premium. After a tender offer is made and 
completed and the target is acquired or the tender offer fails, the stock in the target 
company drops in price, reflecting the loss of the premium that was offered for the stock 
during the tender offer. Short sellers are not permitted to capitalize on this drop in price 
by selling short stock to the entity making the tender offer and then covering the sale after 
the price decline. 
Naked short selling has been outlawed in the U.S. markets. Naked short selling 
occurs when investors sell shares short with out confirming that they can obtain the 
shares that they wish to sell. Naked short sellers hope to close their position before there 
will be a need to deliver the shares. In this way, the naked short seller avoids borrowing 
the shares altogether. This causes many problems, one of them being increasing the 
volatility ofthe overall market. The volatility is created when the naked short seller 
cannot find someone to borrow the shares from when he needs to cover his position. If 
he has trouble finding a buyer and must cover his position, the buyer can make his own 
price, probably a high one, damaging liquidity and creating a short squeeze. 
Ko Securities was fined $150,000 for naked short-selling 46,000 shares of 
EntreMed stock. Ko insisted that by covering the transaction at day's end they had met 
the requirements ofthe affirmative determination rule. On May 3, 1998, the New York 
Times published an article discussing that EntreMed had completed successful clinical 
trials for two cancer battling drugs. On May 4th, EntreMed's share price opened at $85 
compared to $12 at the previous close. Ko shorted 46,000 shares at the inflated price and 
covered near the end of the day at $51. EntreMed's previous day's volume was 19,150 
15 "SEC Approves Short Sale and Manning Rules for Decimals" NASDAQ TRADER website. 3/6/02 
http://www.nasdaqtrader.comltrader/news/200 1 lheadtraderalertslhta2 001-34. stm 
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shares. A NASD Regulation Hearing Panel shot down Ko's argument insisting that their 
actions were inconsistent with the purpose of affirmative determination of providing 
"additional discipline on short selling". 
The SEC has also imposed rules for preventing short sellers from manipulating 
securities offerings. Rule 105 of Regulation M prohibits the covering of short sales with 
securities obtained from an underwriter, broker, or dealer that is participating in a 
securities offering. 16 This rule is necessary because the underwriter, broker or dealer can 
obtain new shares at a discounted price and will often offer new issues to the public at a 
discounted price to the market price. A short seller could take advantage of the 
discounted price by selling shares short before the new issue and then covering the old 
issue stock with stock from the discounted new issue. 
As shown by the Alexander and Peterson study, the uptick rule is quite effective 
in preventing selling at successively lower prices. The uptick rule has effectively ended 
the threat of a bear raid. 
Are there drawbacks to short selling regulation? Hurtado-Sanchez (1978) studied 
the effect of the uptick rule on risk and return in the market. Hurtado-Sanchez found that 
short sales serve to bring down the price of stocks to make their returns commensurate 
with their risk. Hurtado-Sanchez's study concludes that short sale restrictions prevent 
short sellers from bringing down stock prices so that their return becomes commensurate 
with their risk. 17 Therefore, the uptick rule margin requirements, and the inability to use 
funds generated by on short selling cause some stocks to be over-priced compared to their 
risk levels. For example, if a stock provides excess returns in a given month, m, from 
month m to m + 1, the short interest will increase in order to bring returns in line with 
risk. Under current regulation short selling cannot accomplish this. 
Short sales can prevent the prices from increasing. By sending a negative signal to 
the market and/or exhausting all buyers at a particular price, short sellers can also keep 
long sellers from selling at higher prices or give them a signal sell at a lower price. This 
indirect way for short sellers to influence the stock price is not nearly as effective as 
being able to sell at successively lower prices. Therefore, the ability of the market to 
16 "Short Sale Restrictions" U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission website. Online. 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/shortrestrict.htm. March 3, 2002. 
17 Hurtado-Sanchez: 980 
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absorb the information provided by the short sales is compromised by the existence of the 
uptick rule and the constraints of restrictions on the reinvestment of short sale generated 
funds. 
Figlewski (1981) studied the effect of short selling on the equilibrium price of 
stocks. Figlewski developed a demand function that considers short selling and a supply 
function that consists of total shares outstanding and virtual shares created by shorting. 
The demand function shows that the total elimination of short selling as a market function 
creates excess demand at the previous market clearing price (i.e. the market clearing price 
wI short selling). This causes the equilibrium price to be bid up to a higher price. Supply 
and demand curves are formed on the idea that they represent all available information. 
If the short seller's informational effect is eliminated, only the long seller's informational 
effect remains. Without short selling, realized returns to the long investor, on average 
will be lower than anticipated. IS This is the scenario in a market without short selling; 
however, this line ofthinking can be expanded to a market with severely regulated short 
selling. Fewer investors will attempt to short stocks and the market will be hampered in 
the same way, albeit less drastically, as the market where short selling is extinct. 
Woolridge and Dickinson (1994) found that higher beta stocks have significantly 
larger short interest ratios and significant larger variability in their short interest ratios on 
NASDAQ compared to NYSE and Amex during their study period. 19 Their study period 
was pre-NASDAQ Rule 3350. These results seem to affirm that in a less regulated 
market there is more liberal trading with short sales, resulting in more short interest 
movement in either direction. Their work also shows that stocks with higher risk are 
shorted more than stocks with lower risk. This phenomenon is similar to what happens in 
the options market where options volume tends to be larger for higher beta stocks. If the 
stock is likely to make a drastic tum then it is more attractive to short. 
Figlewski (1981) believes that existence of tradable options may reduce some of 
the negative effects of short selling constraints on the market. For example, a trader with 
an unfavorable opinion of a company's outlook can buy puts or write calls in order to 
speculate on the future movement of the stock price. This information about puts and 
18 Figlewski: 473 
19 Woolridge and Dickenson: 27 
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calls will affect the valuation of the underlying stock, thus incorporating the unfavorable 
information, indirectly.2o 
Hurtado-Sanchez (1978) believes that the market imperfections caused by these 
barriers to short selling are significant enough to warrant the easing of restrictions on 
short selling, including the abolishment of the uptick rule, margin requirement, and the 
restriction on the use of short-sale proceeds.21 One possible argument for the abolition of 
these restrictions is the depth of information available to build a case against those who 
criminally manipulate the financial markets. The electronic records of individual 
transactions are extraordinarily detailed today compared with what was available during 
the time in which today's short selling regulations were drafted. Today, the technology 
exists where orderly markets can be maintained by the threat of prosecution rather than 
by restrictions that create inefficiencies. As a counter to that argument, prosecution in the 
U.S. justice system can be a long process. By the time that the system could respond to 
abusers of short selling, the damage may already be uncontrollable. 
As there are reasons for abolishing short selling regulations, there are also reasons 
for keeping them in effect. First, investors can only manufacture a bear raid without an 
uptick rule. It is impossible to execute a bear raid when you cannot short sell at 
consecutively lower prices. Secondly, the regulations restrict short selling to more 
informed investors. If making a short sale was as easy as making a long sale in every 
way and all investors used short sales in trading then volatility might increase as the 
average investor could then not only hype up a stock, but hype down a stock as well. 
Thirdly, the Hurtado-Sanchez work is not exhaustive. We do not have any real working 
models for how the financial markets without short selling restrictions would function in 
today's economic and informational climate. Fourthly, Woolridge and Dickenson 
(1994)found during their examination of Amex, NYSE, and NASDAQ during the pre-
NASD Rule 3350 that there were no significant differences in the test results between any 
of the three markets examined. They concluded that the uptick rule has no significant 
effect on the price fluctuations in the markets.22 Therefore, there is no need to alter the 
20 Figlewski: 475 
21 Hurtado-Sanchez: 980 
22 Woolridge: 26 
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uptick rule in markets that have it and no need to establish an uptick rule in markets that 
do not use it. 
Due to frequent requests of relief from the short sale rule and a general sense that 
short sale regulation may be antiquated, on October 20, 1999, The SEC issued a concept 
release and a request for comments the alteration of Rule 10a-l. The specific concepts 
that they solicited comment on are: 
• Suspending the short sale rule when the security or market is above a 
threshold price; 
• Providing an exception for actively traded securities; 
• Focusing short sale restrictions on certain market events and trading 
strategies; 
• Excepting hedging transactions from short sale regulation; 
• Revising short sale regulation in response to certain market developments; 
• Revising the definition of "short sale"; 
• Extending the short sale rule to non-exchange listed securities; and 
• Eliminating Rule 10a-l 
No action has been taken on this concept release yet. However, this release 
demonstrates that the SEC is willing to change short selling regulation in response to how 
it affects the markets, market makers and investors. Unfortunately, as with a 1976 
investigation into short selling a majority of the comments published on the SEC website 
appear to be negative. The SEC received 12 comment letters in response to a series of 
proposals to ease short selling restrictions in 1976. Eight commenters including the 
NYSE and Amex opposed changes in regulation. Once again, changes in short selling 
legislation may get swept aside because of the negative attitude toward short sellers. A 
1991 congressional report on short selling concluded that there is a psychological 
misperception that short sellers possess much greater manipulative power than they really 
do. 
History of Short Selling 
The negative attitude toward short sellers has its roots at the beginning of the 
development of modem equity markets. Short selling's written past began in early 
seventeenth century Holland when joint stock companies were created to fund new 
-- 16 -
sailing ventures such as the Dutch East India Company. The hype surrounding these 
expeditions grew to extreme levels and the values of their stock were inflated to 
ridiculous amounts. Short sellers entered the market and began to speculate on the 
bursting of what would later be called the South Sea Bubble. Since there were no 
regulations on short selling at the time, short sellers were allowed to short sell at 
consecutively lower prices. Short sellers raided the market by shorting every share of 
stock that they could get their hands on. Short sellers increased supply and drove the 
prices ofthe stock ofthe sailing ventures down. At the same time the hype that drove the 
ascent of the stocks prices waned and the combination of the factors caused the bubble to 
finally burst. Sailing ventures' stock prices plummeted. The directors of the expeditions 
wrote to the government expressing their extreme displeasure with the short sellers who 
made money of their plummeting stock. The Dutch government decreed short selling in 
the Dutch markets was prohibited. This was the first known short selling regulation. The 
decree was for the most part ignored and eventually it was repealed.23 
A similar situation to the South Sea Bubble occurred a few years later when a 
frenzy started in the market for tulips. This rather innocent looking flower caused much 
financial hardship when, after people who speculated on tulip bulbs drove the prices to 
extraordinary levels, a disease hit the bulbs and the crop withered and died. Again 
valuations plummeted and although happy and rich, the investors who sold tulip futures 
short ended up taking the scorn of those who lost money, even though their speculating 
did not have much to do with the fact that the valuations fell. The government tried 
something new and levied a tax against those who sold short to appease the ones who lost 
money. 24 
In 1867, the British parliament passed Leeman's Act, prohibiting short sales in 
bank stocks. This, like the regulations after the South Sea Bubble, was soon ignored and 
disregarded by businessmen and the courts. A French Royal decree in 1724 outlawed 
short selling by limiting legal market transactions to exchanges of securities in which the 
securities were in the possession of the seller. 25 This was the evolution of short selling 
23 Staley: 235-6 
24 Idid: 236 
2S Ibid: 237 
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regulation. From outlawing to taxation, many techniques have been used to impair short 
selling activities. 
Short selling in the United States has a past marred by scandal. Short sellers 
began to enter the U.S. exchanges enforce in the late 1800's when speculation on 
railroad stocks reached their peak. Some investors attempted bear raids on railroad 
stocks during this time period, inflaming other investors who held these stocks long. It 
was during these times that the long sellers came up with an equally devious counter to 
the bear raid called a corner. A comer is a short squeeze where the available supply is 
held by one or two entities. This allows for great price control by the entities that have 
physical control of the stock. 26 Basically, a long seller that identified a potential bear 
raid, or even sometimes no bear raid, just a large amount of short interest, would 
purchase as many shares as he could from the short sellers who were selling the stock and 
other long sellers. After the long investor controlled a significant amount of stock, he 
would encourage an investor who had loaned shares to the short sellers to demand return 
of their stock. Since short sellers must deliver the physical shares within five days, when 
the short seller went to the market to find shares to replace the shares he had borrowed, 
he found the entity that orchestrated the comer would be the only place to buy physical 
shares. Therefore who ever held the shares could demand whatever price he wanted from 
the short sellers. Often the price the entity demanded would be ten-fold or larger from 
whence the short seller started selling. On more than one occasion the exchanges had to 
intervene and force a settlement between the parties. Usually, both the short sellers and 
the entity that created the comer were punished. 
All short selling abuses aren't confined to outsiders of the company. In 1929, 
Albert Wiggin, head of Chase National Bank, shorted 42,000 shares of his company's 
stock. His trades were legal at the time but they were obviously not in the interest of the 
shareholders, which he represented as an executive of Chase. This abuse led to an SEC 
rule that prohibits executives from shorting shares of the company where they are 
employed. 27 
26 Ibid: 238-9 
27 Florian, Ellen. "Schemers and scams: a brief history of bad business" Fortune vol. 145 no. 6 (March 18, 
2002): pg. 62 - 3. 
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Today's short selling regulation was developed as a result ofthe stock market 
crash of 1929. Congress looked into short selling but could not reach a conclusion about 
how to regulate it. So congress granted the SEC broad powers to regulate short selling. 
The short selling regulation discussed in the previous section was developed in the 
1930's and has remained virtually intact since then. 
Strategies of Short Sellers 
There are several reasons for short selling. Particular strategies exist that are used 
to identify stocks as good short sale targets. A study conducted by the NYSE in 1947 
identified the speculative motive as responsible for two thirds of total short interest. 28 
Hedging and arbitrage, not speculation, are the two primary reasons to short sell today. 
The most notable purpose of short selling is speculation. It is this type of short 
selling that creates the wrath toward short sellers and makes newspaper headlines. If an 
investor believes that a stock is overvalued or will see a drop in its value in the near term, 
they can short sell the stock in order to profit from its loss of value. 
It is well established in financial circles that speculative short sellers excel at 
research. Often, short sellers are the hardest working investors because there is much 
more at stake in a short sale then there is in a long sale. In a long sale the most an 
investor can lose is the amount their investment. In a short sale an investor's losses are 
only limited by the highest price that a stock can reach. Theoretically, a stock's price can 
rise to infinite levels. Therefore, in theory, short sellers incur the risk of infinite losses. 
Because of the risks of a short squeeze, short sellers usually limit their search for 
overvalued stocks to large cap stocks (commonly stocks with a market value of greater 
than $500 million) with afloat (shares not insider owned and not in a portfolio that 
consists of over 5% of total shares outstanding of the firm's stock) of 10 million shares.z9 
Short sellers are often very reluctant to disclose their positions for fear of a short squeeze 
that can occur as a result of a buy-in. Buy-ins occur when those from who the short 
sellers borrowed stock demand their physical shares be replaced. When this happens a 
short seller is required to find physical shares for the lender and replace them at the going 
market price. Buy-ins are rare because, with the use of margin accounts, brokers can 
28 McDonald and Baron: 98 
29 Staley: 16 
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easily shift stock certificates from one investor to another when multiple investors hold a 
particular issue. This keeps the short seller from having to close his position. Instead, 
the broker replaces the lender's shares with shares borrowed from another investor. 
In a market decline, McDonald and Baron (1974) observed that higher beta stocks 
tend to produce higher profits for the short seller. This seems to be in conformity with 
the idea that riskier stocks produce higher returns. The long seller makes money during a 
market increase; the short seller makes money during periods of market decline. 30 
Executives from companies plagued with high short interest have attempted to 
squeeze short sellers by asking their shareholders to request delivery of their stock 
certificates31 . This is a ploy used by management to keep their sinking stock afloat for as 
long as possible. Sometimes management can do real damage to short sellers positions, 
increase volatility, and decrease liquidity in the market for their issues by their actions. 
Many times in the past short sellers have been correct with their picks of stocks 
that were overvalued and their choices of companies that were on the verge of collapse. 
In 2000, some short sellers were aware that Enron was in danger of collapse. In February 
2001, a firm that specialized in shorting stocks called Bethany McLean of Fortune and in 
her words "suggested that I look at the company's financial statements and see ifI could 
understand how the company made money.,,32 Bethany wrote a story in late February 
2001 for Fortune that was critical ofEnron's accounting. Later in 2001, Enron fell into 
bankruptcy. Its stock is now almost worthless, fell from a high of $80 a share in just over 
a year. 
What are some things that short sellers to look at to determine if a company is a 
good target for a short sale? Short sellers look toward both technical analysis and 
fundamental analysis to find short selling opportunities. Technical analysis is an analysis 
of past performance and future market trends. Those who use technical analysis may see 
high short interest as a sign that a stock is headed for failure and short those stocks. They 
may also short stocks that have reached their resistance level. The resistance level is a 
particular price at which a stock has reached multiple times but is unable to break 
30 McDonald and Baron: 101 
31 Weiss: Online 
32 Interview. Bethany McLean and Jon Stewart. The Daily Show with Jon Stewart. Comedy Central. 
(February 20, 2002 I1PM). 
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through. Usually, technical analysis is accomplished using charts and developing a 
resistance level, support level (bottom price from which a stock always recovers), and 
trend-line for a stock. 
When searching for abnormal returns, McDonald and Baron (1974) and 
Woolridge and Dickinson (1997) both found that timed short positions under performed 
naIve short positions. They created a short portfolios of stocks used in their study with 
the highest levels of short interest during a given month and rebalanced that portfolio 
every month during their study to include the stocks with the highest levels of short 
interest from the issues used in their study. They also shorted a portfolio of all stocks 
with that they used in their study. They found that the random portfolios out performed 
the portfolio that had only the highest short interest stocks. These results suggest that 
shorting because a stock only because it has high short interest is not particularly wise. 
Fundamental analysis involves examining the parts of a company's financial 
statements, the income statement, balance sheet, statement of shareholders equity, and 
statement of cash flows, for weaknesses. Fundamental analysis is usually focused on 
finding companies who cannot support their spending habits. Just like when a person 
consistently spends more money than she takes in is headed for bankruptcy, a company 
that consistently outspends its income is headed for disaster. Bankruptcy is the ultimate 
low for a company and typically results in a massive devaluation of the company's stock 
price. Obviously, if short sellers can predict the occurrence of bankruptcy reliably, they 
can profit from their knowledge by selling short an unhealthy company that is headed for 
bankruptcy before that knowledge has been factored into the stock price. 
A weak working capital position is a sign that a company may be headed for 
trouble. Working capital consists of liquid assets and minus liabilities that are short term 
in nature (due in less than one year). Working capital is a measurement that says if a 
company's creditors were to call in their debts on the company and request payment 
immediately, could the company pay all the debts with the cash and other liquid assets 
that they have on hand. Weak working capital can increase a company's risk and make it 
a good target for short sellers. 
During bad economic times, short sellers look for companies that are highly 
leveraged. Banks fund much of the operations of a highly leveraged company. If a 
--
- 21 -
company is highly leveraged and its expenses from operations are greater than its 
revenues from operations, chances are good that when the company faces a decrease in 
operating revenues because of bad economic times the company will fail. In bad 
economic times, banks will be less generous with funding and companies which are 
highly leveraged already and have net operating losses, will no longer be able to pay their 
debts, much less support their operations. 33 
Firms with a low return on equity make for popular short selling targets. These 
companies have to go to the banks or the market to raise money to fund their growth 
quite often. Return on equity consists of net income available to common stockholders 
divided by total common equity. On the other hand, firms with high return on equity 
make for a lousy short sale because of their ability to fund their own growth. 
Firms can fund growth in two ways. A firm with a low return on equity must 
fund its growth by issuing bonds, common or preferred stock, borrowing bank or seeking 
venture capital. A firm with a high return on equity funds its growth through internal 
operations by using retained earnings (the cumulative total of yearly net income not paid 
to common stockholders through a dividend). The issuance of bonds or borrowing from 
others increases the risk of the firm by increasing its interest payments and debt. The 
fixed nature of interest and retirement payments on debt decreases the ability of a firm to 
weather hard times and escape bankruptcy. In addition, issuing common or preferred 
stock creates an increased supply of stock on the market. The more stock issued, the 
lower price each consecutive issue will fetch, therefore creating downward pressure on 
the stock's price. The short seller welcomes either ofthe outcomes that low return on 
equity can create.34 
Deschow et al (2001) found that short sellers tend to favor stocks with low 
fundamental-to-price ratios: cash flow to price, earnings to price, book to market, and 
value to market (the quantity book value of common equity plus the present value of 
future abnormal returns divided by market price). Their research shows that short sellers 
appear to use these ratios in order to identify stocks that are overpriced. They cover their 
short positions as the stocks' prices decline, thus bringing the stocks' values back in line 
33 Walker: 123 
34 Staley: 108 
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with the fundamentals. This study helps confirm that the speculative motive for short 
selling exists and has a real influence on the prices of stocks. Deschow et al also 
discovered that short sellers make an active effort to exploit the predictable returns 
associated with shorting low fundamentals-to-price ratio stocks.35 
Short sellers also scrutinize intangible assets for possible overstatements. Firms 
can improve their balance sheet by overstating the value of patents, goodwill, copyrights 
and other assets for which an exact value cannot be computed. Short sellers identify the 
firms in which intangible assets are overstated. Overstatement in and of itself is not a 
sound reason to short a firm's stock; however, it may be indicative of other things going 
on in the firm.36 
In the insurance industry, short sellers look for items that eat away at an insurance 
company's surplus.37 Surplus (assets minus liabilities and contributed capital) is a 
measure of the amount of assets that an insurance company has left over to cover unusual 
claims such as a natural (earthquakes, tornadoes, or hurricanes) or a man made (asbestos 
liabilities or the WTC attacks) disaster. A weak surplus position puts the company at risk 
for failure if a disaster hits. The insurance commission in the state in which an insurance 
company incorporates regulates the amount of surplus an insurance company must have. 
However, most insurance companies carry well above this amount of surplus. Short 
sellers usually set the bar for insurance companies higher than the state insurance 
commissions do. 
Short sellers also try to identify firms with poor or unethical management. 
Managers with a reputation for sinking firms have a tendency to continue to sink firms 
until someone intervenes and stops them from managing. These are sometimes the 
hardest good short sell targets for a short seller to detect. Unethical managers tend to be 
very shrewd businessmen. Shareholders are not stupid. They would not place the 
managers in a position to manage the company without believing that the managers were 
good and forthright people. These types of managers often fool analysts into lauding 
their businesses. Short sellers are very much alone when they go after a target because of 
unethical management. 
35 Deschow et al: 78-105 
36 Staley: 123 
37 Ibid: 139 
--
- 23 -
Short sellers also look for mature industries that are undergoing some kind of 
revolutionary change, whether that change is heavy litigation or a sharp decrease in the 
demand for the product or service of the industry. When an industry is in this position, a 
short seller will pursue one of two strategies. She will short the marginal company or the 
institutional favorite. Marginal companies are companies with poor financials as 
discussed earlier, bad management or overly aggressive business strategies. The 
institutional favorite is the company that looks good but has a lot of institutionally owned 
stock. A high percentage of institutional ownership provides less risk for the short seller 
of a short squeeze. Also, institutional investors are usually slow to act on problem 
companies. The descent of the institutional favorite will tend to be slow to begin but very 
rapid once the institutional investors begin to divest themselves of the company's stock. 
Pairs trading is a strategy that consists of a long position in a firm in a particular 
industry and a short position in another firm in the same industry. Ideally, a pairs trader 
will look for two companies that are highly competitive, where a market share increase 
and high profits for one equals a smaller share of the market and a drop in profits for the 
other. The pairs trader will go long on the firm that is expected to gain value and short on 
the firm that is expected to fall. The pairs trader will profit twice ifhis guess was 
correct.38 
The bane of short sellers is the optimistic outlook of shareholders and lenders. 
Short sell targets usually hold out longer than the short sellers believe that they will. 
Slow acting institutional investors help create this problem. Institutional investors 
include pension funds and mutual funds. For pension funds, especially, changes in the 
composition of the fund must be approved through several different channels. These 
levels of approval can cause a time lag in the recognition of a company's weakness by the 
fund and the actual divesting of the company's stock that the fund owns. These time lags 
can support the stock's price long after it should have naturally fallen. 
Creditors can be persuaded by management to continue to fund the cash flow of 
companies with little or no internally created cash flow. Companies that have been the 
targets of shorts in the past have held out three or more years before their management 
38 Pairs trading. Online. http://www.cms-forex.comJ. April 12002. 
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Once they identify a stock with weak financials or with non-existing or non-profit 
generating operations, it can take years for the company to run out of cash and for 
investors to run out of hope and start selling at lower prices. Short sellers try to estimate 
how long a company can survive on poor financials. Usually they underestimate the 
patience and generosity of banks and investors to keep a failing company a float. Banks 
ultimately choose when a company goes bankrupt because banks control the stream of 
cash that props up troubled companies. 
Parkinson's Law of Short Selling states, "the stock price expands to fill the 
available short capacity and last iota of patience, particularly when it's a no brainer.,,39 In 
other words, a stocks price expands as the latent demand created by the short sales 
increases and then, just when all short sellers are ready to accept their losses by throwing 
in the towel and close their positions at higher prices, the stock price peaks and begins its 
descent. According to Parkinson's law, this usually occurs when it's obvious that a 
company is headed for disaster. 
It is a rule of thumb for short sellers that when analysts stop covering a stock (i.e. 
the stock has fallen so low that analysts believe that it is doomed) it is too late to short.4o 
Short sellers often ridicule analysts for their failure to act quickly on the stocks of failing 
companies. Short sellers believe that most published analysts are too optimistic about the 
future of securities for fear that their firms will face the wrath of slighted management. 
The depth and breadth of the short seller's research is beyond what most analysts 
perform for the following reasons. One, analysts usually cover a large number of issues 
and can only afford to spend time analyzing a particular issue a few times a year. Two, 
because short sellers take on greater risk than their counterparts who invest long in a 
stock, the short sellers must be more careful with their predictions. Many times, short 
sellers are way ahead of market analysts in predicting a stock's demise. The Enron 
example cited earlier is just one of many examples of when the short sellers beat the 
market analysts to the punch. 
39 Staley: 179 
40 Staley: 120 
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Short Sales and Hedging and Arbitrage Activities 
The short interest as recorded by the major exchanges has been increasing 
steadily. In January of 1999 the amount of short interest on the NYSE was 1.9 billion 
shares. In March 2002, short interest on the NYSE was 6.64 billion shares. There are a 
number of reasons for this increase in short selling. First, the pure volume of trades 
overall has increased in during period. With more trading happening on the floor, some 
of that increase can be expected to be reflected in short selling transactions. Second, as 
investors have become more sophisticated they began to understand and use types of 
transactions different than the long buy and sell, including short selling. The more 
sophisticated investors also employ more sophisticated methods in their trading including 
hedging and arbitrage methods. 
Today, only a small percentage of short interest represents the ideas of the 
speculative investor. A source cited in a 1996 article on short selling estimated that 
currently hedging and arbitrage activity by members and non-members represent 98% of 
the current short interest41 . Exchange members, specialists and such are responsible for 
80 - 85% of short sales. This may give a proper indication ofthe amount of short selling 
that can be attributed to hedging and arbitrage strategies, since most exchange members 
work to make markets and profit off of commissions, instead of trading for speculative 
purposes.42 Hedging and arbitrage strategies are important because, the influence of 
institutional hedging and arbitrage as a reason for short sales may have changed the 
traditional relationships of short interest to market movements.43 
Hedging and arbitrage activities that have led to the increase in short interest over 
time are shorting against the box, mutual (hedge) funds, pairs trading, and arbitraging 
options and convertible bonds. Hedging involves playing two opposite strategies in order 
to ensure that your investment is protected from movement in either direction. Arbitrage 
involves profiting off of momentary inefficiencies in the market represented by different 
prices for the same security. It is reasonable to assume that arbitrage and hedging are 
likely to occur more frequently on higher volume issues because the risks of a short 
squeeze are smaller and short sales are easier to execute. 
41 Weiss: Online 
42 Woolridge and Dickenson: 22 
43 Staley: 17 
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Shorting against the box is a relatively well-known hedging strategy. An investor 
shorts against the box in order to insulate themselves from current period taxes. For 
example, Sara Richards is in the 38.5% tax bracket this year, but she plans to retire on 
December 31 st. Next year, her income will put her in the 27.5% tax bracket. Sara 
purchased 100 shares of XXX Co. at $50 a share. In November ofthis year, XXX Co.'s 
stock reaches an all time high of$120 a share. Sara believes that this is as high as the 
stock will go and wishes to close her position and collect the profit; however, she would 
like to defer the capital gains until next year so she can pay 27.5% in taxes rather than 
38.5%. Sara has her broker execute a short sale of her stock at $120, so at December 31 st 
she has opposite positions open in the stock. When January 1 st comes her broker uses her 
stock purchased at $50 a share to close her short position and Sara collects her proceeds, 
taxable at her new tax rate. 
Similarly, shorting against the box can be used in order to defer capital losses 
when an individual's tax rate is expected to increase in the following tax period. An 
investor can also short against the box in order to defer short-term capital losses so they 
are not used to offset current period long-term capital gains (which are taxed at a lower 
rate than standard types of income) dollar for dollar. 
Shorting against the box can allow an investor to take advantage of a temporary 
price decline in a stock44. For example, Sara from the above example cancels her 
retirement and XXX Co. reaches $120. Sara has reason to believe that the stock in XXX 
Co. is at a temporary high and will drop to $100 in the near future. However, Sara also 
believes that this drop will be temporary and after the stock falls, it will resume its ascent. 
Therefore, Sara doesn't wish to close out her position, just take advantage of the 
temporary drop, so she sells short at $120, keeping her long position, and closes her short 
position with newly purchased shares when the stock reaches $100. Thus, she maintains 
her original purchase of 100 shares at $50 the entire time. A temporary price drop in a 
stock could be caused by many factors. Natural disaster, national crisis, and legal liability 
are just a few factors that could cause a temporary drop. 
Margin requirements for shorting against the box are different than for a normal 
long sale. The margin requirements are reduced to 5% of the current market value of the 
44 Walker: 62 - 3 
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long security. Shorting against the box typically occurs toward the end of a tax year and 
is represented by an abnormal increase in short interest. 45 
A study by Brent, Morse and Stice (1990)und that on average, a significant short 
interest decrease of6.12% occurs in the month of January. They were unable to find 
significant results of a corresponding increase in November and December that would 
infer that a good amount of short interest change is explained by shorting against the box. 
However, although insignificant, rather large increases in short interest do occur in 
November and December. One reason that these increases may not be significant like the 
decrease in January is that those who short against the box can set their play up 
throughout an entire year, but they will almost always close it in January. They close it 
in January because there is not any benefit to shorting against the box except to postpone 
a gain or loss to a different tax year. Nothing is to be gained by postponing the closing of 
the transaction beyond January 1 st, but a short against the box strategy can be set up any 
time from January to December.46 
Specialists often use short sales to create liquidity in the issues in which they deal. 
For instance, if a buy order for XXX Co. was given to an XXX Co. specialist who 
believed that the price would fall in XXX Co. in the very near future, the specialist might 
go ahead and execute the order buy borrowing shares from those who wish to make a sale 
order at a higher price. When the price drops, the specialist can take a sell order that 
comes in and replace the borrowed stock. The specialist profits of the difference in price. 
Lest you think the specialist makes money off of this exchange without absorbing any 
risk, the specialist may lose on this deal if the stock price rises. However, specialists tend 
to know the stocks that they are covering very well and they can tum a transaction such 
as this into a profit more often than not. 
Mutual funds are employed by many investors to diversify their portfolios without 
having to maintain a portfolio many different companies with only a few stocks of each 
company. There are three types of mutual funds that use short selling. Pure short funds 
use their assets to short sell only, indexes or individual stocks. Investors use pure short 
funds, called hedge funds, to insulate themselves from a down market. Market mutual 
45 Brent, Morse and Stice:. 275 
46 Ibid: 281 
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funds combine long and short positions to make steady returns regardless of the direction 
of the market. Thus in an up market one can expect that the market mutual fund will hold 
many long positions and in a down market, the market mutual funds will hold many short 
positions. A diversified fund permits its managers to make strategic bets that certain 
stocks will fail. Managers of these funds are allowed to speculate on the future of stocks 
much like a professional short seller. However, most of the assets of the diversified fund 
remain in long positions.47 
A popular arbitrage move that uses short selling involves firm mergers and 
acquisitions. Typically, the lower priced stock of the two stocks involved in a (the target 
company) merger or acquisition will increase toward the price of the higher priced stock 
(the acquiring company) and the higher priced stock will decrease in price toward the 
lower priced stock. In order to arbitrage this difference, a trader can go short in the 
higher priced stock and long in the lower priced stock. This allows the trader to profit off 
ofthe coming together of the firm's share prices. 
Convertible bond offerings are also used in a type of arbitrage strategy. For 
instance, XXX Co. convertible bonds are selling for $900 a piece and they are convertible 
into 20 shares of XXX Co. stock. If XXX Co. common stock is trading for $50 a share 
an arbitrageur would short sell 20 shares of XXX Co. for a total of$1000. Then he 
would purchase the XXX Co. convertible bond for $900 and immediately convert the 
bond and cover his short sale, recording a profit of $1 00 ($1000 - $900). Arbitraging 
situations like this are short lived, but a savvy investor with a close eye on the market can 
sometimes take advantage of this type of transaction. Other securities that can be used in 
similar types of arbitraging moves with short sales are preemptive rights, options and 
preferred stock. 48 
Many strategies exist that a short seller can use if a firm has tradable options. If a 
trader expects the price to decline in XXX Co., he can write a both a put and call option 
on XXX Co. and sell short shares of XXX Co. stock. If the price of XXX Co. declines, 
then the options offset each other and the trader benefits from any gain on the short sale. 
If the price increases, the trader is protected from losses up to the premiums earned on 
47 Adiga, Aravind. "Funds that short" Money (July 2001): 82 
48 Walker: 58 
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writing both the put and the call option. In this way the trader protects himself from 
small fluctuations in the XXX Co. 's price.49 
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Brent, Morse and Stice (1990) regressed annual short interest outstanding in a 
particular issue by seven variables. The variables that seemed to have consistent 
explanatory power are beta, the existence of options, and the existence of convertible 
securities. There are a large number of arbitrage activities that can be performed by short 
selling and concurrently buying/selling puts and call options or buying convertible 
securities. Brent, Morse and Stice's findings show that annual short interest is related to 
the whether options or convertible securities exist for an issue and the beta of the given 
issue. This points to arbitrage motives as being a large reason for increasing short 
interest. The beta variable points to hedging also as an influence of short interest.5o 
Brent, Morse and Stice (1990) also developed time series models that show short 
interest and open options tend to move together through the options cycle. An options 
cycle is typically three months in length and the day after the expiration date of one 
option cycle is the beginning of the next cycle of options. For example, when an option 
expires in April, the months of February and March show an increase in open short 
interest. In April, short interest increases until the expiration date than decreases sharply 
during the expiration date and immediately following, then the next cycle begins and so 
on. As open interest in a stock's options increases, the short interest in the stock 
increases. This is more evidence that short selling for arbitrage purposes is a very 
significant motive for short selling.51 
There is a type of transaction called a short exempt transaction that is exempt 
from the uptick rule. An arbitrage purchase of a convertible security and a short sale of a 
stock is a short exempt transaction. Because the investor can make immediate delivery of 
the shares via the convertible security, the trade is exempt from the uptick rule. 
Hedging and arbitrage strategies influence on short interest is important, because 
when research considers short selling's informational effect, hedging and arbitrage 
activities dilute the informational effect. Most research on short selling considers that 
short sellers have some type of information not available to other investors. Whether that 
49 Walker: 102 
50 Brent, Morse and Stice: 282-4 
51 Brent, Morse and Stice: 285 
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information comes from divine inspiration or as a result of their intense research, it 
doesn't matter. It does matter that hedgers and arbitragers have different reasons for 
short selling, which are entirely unrelated to the assumed superior knowledge of 
speculative short sellers. 
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Most studies that examine the effect of short sales, as measured by short interest 
or short interest ratio, attempt to control for hedging and arbitrage strategies. Senchack 
(1993) says "observed market reaction to short-interest announcements may be 
underestimated due to non-informational short sales associated with dividend-related 
strategies. ,,52 
Corporate Attitude Toward Short Sellers 
Corporate executives are alarmed when their company has a high level of short 
interest. Sometimes this alarm can tum into determination, where management attempts 
to fight the short sellers. This reaction is attributable to two factors. The first factor is 
the negative attitude toward short selling that is present in society. The second factor is 
that management probably sees high short interest as an indictment of their managerial 
skills. 
Examples were given above of management comers where they attempted to 
profit off of a short squeeze by buying as many shares of their company as they could 
obtain and forcing a settlement price on the short sellers. This type of action is not 
tolerated in today's markets; however less greedy but equally sinister methods of 
punishing short sellers exist. Management has written letters to all shareholders of a 
given date, lamenting that their company that was besieged by short sellers and 
encouraging their shareholders to request that their shares be taken out of margin 
accounts, in order to force a buy-in and a short-squeeze on the short sellers. Management 
has also gone to the exchanges in order to seek retribution. A 1991 congressional inquiry 
that had a negative attitude towards short selling was brought about by angered 
management in order to make short selling regulation even more restrictive to the short 
seller. 
S2 Senchack: 185 
-- 31 -
Sometimes management has a right to be upset with the activities of short sellers. 
Unscrupulous short selling is easier today than it was 20 years ago because of the 
increasing use of electronic bulletin boards and email in order to share trading 
information. On-line trading also makes manipulation easier because a trader does not 
have to speak with a broker directly to make a trade. The broker can serve as a clearing 
house for information before on-line trading. 
A method of unscrupulous short selling is similar to the market manipulative 
pump and dump for long traders. Pump and dump is an unethical practice that occurs 
when a trader can secure a rather large position in a very low priced and relatively 
unknown company. The trader will then pose as an officer of the company, an agent, or a 
member of the scientific community and encourage others to buy the company's stock by 
lying about the outlook of the company, results of the company's research, or a change in 
company management, sales or profits. The trader profits when the demand that he 
creates causes enough people to buy the company's shares and dramatically raise the 
pnce. The trader will then sell all his shares at a profit and attempt to disappear. 
Short selling has a similar practice called the short and distort. In a short and 
distort, an individual will take a large short interest in a firm with a relatively small 
market capitalization. Then the individual will pose as an officer, analyst, agent or 
scientist and spread false information about the firm. The individual will then hopes that 
because of his misleading information, the price of the firm's stock will decline and he 
can cover his sales at a profit. 
On August 25, 2000, a news release about Internet Wire reported that the 
company was under SEC investigation for accounting fraud and the imminent resignation 
oflnternet Wire's CEO. The stock price Internet Wire dropped of60% following the 
news release. Later, it was found that Mark Jakob who made $241,000 from the short 
sale oflnternet Wire shares falsely created the report. Jakob was later arrested and 
convicted of market manipulation. He currently faces 3 years in prison and a half million 
dollars in fines and restitution. 53 
53Unknown Author. "Former News Staffer Gets Jail Time for E-Posting Fake Press Release." Securities 
Litigation and Regulation Reporter. Vol. 7, No.4 (September 12,2001): 8 
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The fight between the corporate executives and short sellers is one that is fueled 
by hysteria, ignorance and the occasional scandalous act. Both sides of this battle are to 
blame for the conflict. Short sellers, although misunderstood, have a reputation for 
unethical practice due to the few who use methods such as the short and distort. 
Corporate executives have a misunderstanding of short sellers and short selling's function 
and effects on the market that create unnecessary tension. This misunderstanding is 
driven by the general negative attitude toward the short sellers because of their perception 
as the anti-bulls who profit off of everyone else's misery. 
Are short sellers really anti-bulls? Sure, short sellers profit off of drops in a 
company's stock price, however; they do not profit off of drops in the stock prices of 
companies that they do not themselves short. A short seller's wish is to make money for 
himself, not to see people suffer. Therefore, it can be surmised that short sellers do not 
wish for down markets, rather they wish for stocks that they've identified as over valued 
and with low potential to fall. 
Is it not more important to look at the short sellers effect on the market rather than 
their personal wishes anyway? The questions that should be asked before one makes up 
his mind about short selling are: Does high short interest in the market signal a future 
bear market or bull market? And if a stock has high short interest will it rise in price or 
will the price drop? These are questions over which much research has been completed 
in the past four decades and a definitive answer may not exist. The evidence for both the 
bearish case and the bullish case will be presented in the following sections. 
Is High Short Interest Bearish? 
In a study that analyzed the NYSE from 1946 - 1965, Seneca (1967) contends that 
short sales predict future price downturns. Seneca believes that a high short interest ratio 
is not itself a causal factor of market prices, but an indication of other factors (based on 
economic, political and psychological issues) operating in the market. Seneca believes 
that short interest ratios represent investor confidence. When investor confidence is low, 
the market will decline. 54 
54 Seneca: 70 
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Seneca revised his study in 1968, noting that the size of the short ratio is not the 
important factor, but the movement of the short ratio (growing or declining) is what 
should be noted. When the short interest ratio is growing then the market is expected to 
decline. The change in short interest ratio in Seneca's study is a product of the weighted 
average of the previous two periods. This is an attempt to eliminate anomalies such as 
shorting against the box type strategies. 
Research by Figlewski (1981) on the informational effects of short selling also 
studied whether short selling provides information about the pricing of securities. 
Figlewski set up two portfolios, one long portfolio containing 207 of the lowest short 
interest stocks and a short portfolio containing 207 of the highest short interest stocks. 
Four hundred and fourteen stocks that had reported short interest and complete market 
information were examined from January 1973 to June 1979. The long portfolio 
produced a profit from positive excess returns for the investor. The short portfolio 
produced lower excess returns. When the short portfolio could be used as a low cost 
source of funding for the long portfolio, a higher rate of return would have been earned 
for the investor than ifhe would have been solely invested in the long portfolio. 
Figlewski found that excess returns are negatively correlated with short interest. Firms 
with high short interest ratios provide higher negative excess returns. Figlewski's study 
supports his hypothesis that prices of stocks for which there was relatively more adverse 
information among investors would tend to be too high. 
Senchack and Starks (1993) explored short-sale restrictions their effect on the 
price ofNYSE and Amex stocks. Senchack and Starks isolated those issues from NYSE 
and Amex, which had an unusually large change in short interest for their sample. They 
conclude that a negative market reaction occurs around the announcement date of a large 
unexpected increase in short interest. They found that the existence of tradable options 
reduces the attractiveness of short selling. Non-optioned stocks tend to react more 
strongly to change in short interest. Senchack and Starks shows that short-term negative 
abnormal returns tend to be less negative if a firm has tradable options. Since options 
provide another method of speculating, fewer investors speculate using short selling 
when options are available. 
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Senchack and Starks also note the small firm effect exists in short selling. 
Senchack and Starks utilized a model that included a variable for the availability of 
information about a firm. They found that firms with less information available about 
them (typically firms with a small market capitalization) have an enhanced reaction to a 
large change in short sales compared with larger firms that attract more media and analyst 
coverage. 
Choie and Hwang (1994) studied the profitability of short selling and the 
exploitability of short information. They analyzed 36 months of statistics, from January 
1989 through December 1991. They examined four categories of change in short interest 
ofNYSE listed stocks (largest change, largest percentage increase, largest position, and 
largest short ratio). The authors measured the closing stock prices twenty days following 
the announcement date of the short interest statistics. They concluded that those issues 
with a large reported short position under perform the S&P 500 on average. The authors 
made no attempt to control for non-informational short selling (hedging and arbitrage). 
Choie and Hwang believe that if it were possible to control for these factors that those 
with a large amount of informational short sales would under perform the market to a 
greater degree. 
A study by Albert, Smaby and Robison (1997) computes the mean cumulative 
abnormal returns on Amex, NYSE and NASDAQ stocks. Negative abnormal returns 
appear in both the post-compilation period and post-publication period of short interest. 
This suggests that publication oflarge short interest is a bearish signal to other investors. 
The authors also find evidence of a small stock effect in short sales. Interestingly, the 
authors found that during the period of their study (January 1987 - January 1991) firms 
listed on the NYSE and Amex earned larger abnormal returns for the short seller than on 
the NASDAQ. This is significant because during the period ofthe study, there was no 
uptick rule for NASDAQ securities. This seems to be opposite of traditional thinking, 
where an unregulated market promotes larger abnormal returns. 
Is High Short Interest Bullish? 
Most long investors look at high short interest as being a bullish indicator. These 
investors see high short interest as latent demand because at some point short sellers must 
cover their positions by purchasing stock. Usually a short interest ratio that is greater 
-- 35 -
than 3.00 is seen to be bullish.55 Although this is the common view among investors, the 
evidence supporting this viewpoint is rather scarce compared to the evidence that high 
short interest is bearish. 
Immediately after the publication of Seneca's article in 1967 supporting short 
interest as a bearish signal, Hanna (1968) replied with some observations of his own. 
Hanna criticized some of the methods used in Seneca's research. He then suggested his 
own method for measuring the effect of short interest. Hanna recommended an 
adjustment to Seneca's analysis by restricting the abnormally large and small 
representations of short interest to those that are greater than 1 or 1.5 standard deviations 
away from the mean, thus isolating those issues where the informational effect of short 
selling is apparent. This adjustment was later used in several studies already mentioned 
including, Figlewski (1981), Senchak and Starks (1993), and Choie and Hwang (1994). 
Hanna's contention that short interest is bullish lies in tracing the performance of 
portfolios based on assumptions about short interest. Hanna assumed that high short 
interest was bearish, as per Seneca's study and invested when short interest was low and 
exited the market when short interest was high. This portfolio resulted in six consecutive 
losses, whereas a portfolio that assumed high short interest was bullish resulted in over 
1,000 per cent hypothetical gains. Therefore, Hanna concludes that the evidence shows 
high short interest is bullish. 
The Case for Neither Bearish Nor Bullish? 
Kerrigan (1974) looked at 200 monthly short interest ratios from October 1952 to 
May 1969. Kerrigan found that there is a high correlation between the short interest over 
two, three and four months indicating that short interest ratios tend to move toward their 
average value. He also found evidence that indicated that high short interest ratios are 
bullish and low short interest ratios are bearish. However, upon further inspection he 
found that the short interest volume component of the short interest ratio is relatively 
uncorrelated with changes in the market. On the other hand, there is a high amount of 
correlation between the average daily volume component of the short interest ratio and 
market movements. Therefore, he concludes that the reason that high short interest ratios 
55 Walker: 128-129 
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are bullish has nothing to do with the change in short interest, but it has a lot to do with 
the change in average daily volume. The effectiveness of the short interest ratio is mainly 
due to the tendency for volume to be relatively high during bull markets and low during 
bear markets. High and falling short interest ratios represent increasing average daily 
volume as much as they represent decreasing short interest because average daily volume 
is in the denominator ofthe short interest ratio. High short interest ratios are a predictor 
of future bull markets only if they tend not to stay high for long. 
Hurtado-Sanchez (1978) studied the nature and the extent of the relationship 
between a stock's short interest that stock's recent past and proximate future 
performance. He examined 425 industrials and selected every other stock within each 
industry grouping as control sample. He sampled all NYSE stocks with consistently high 
short interest as his test sample. His study covers a 21 month period between January 
1966 and September 1967. He examined seven variants of short interest including short 
interest changes and measured excess returns via the capital asset pricing model (CAPM). 
His results found that short interest, regardless of the variants, does not affect current or 
future returns. He also found that after or during the period when stocks experience 
excess returns that are greater than those of other stocks, they are heavily shorted. He 
concluded that short sales help to bring a stock's returns in line with its risk and by 
creating imperfections in the short selling mechanism (through regulation) the regulators 
are creating discrepancies between expected and realized returns. 
Brent, Morse and Stice (1990) found that there is no relationship between changes 
in short interest and returns in subsequent months. Only one year out of four measured 
years (1981 - 1984) showed a significant negative return when there was a decrease in 
short interest during the prior month. During the rest of the years mean return and 
change in short interest were uncorrelated. 
Woolridge and Dickinson (1994) sought to find whether short sales affect security 
prices and to determine whether a high level of short interest is bullish or bearish. They 
measured 50 companies from the NASDAQ and 50 from the NYSE and Amex, 
combined, over a six-year period (1986 - 1991). They used linear regression to test the 
relationships between monthly returns and changes in short position. They found that the 
slope coefficient was slightly positive yet insignificant when they regressed the return on 
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a firm's stock as the dependant variable and short interest as the independent variable. 
The positive relationship would suggest that as short interest increases, so does the 
monthly return on the stocks, thus presenting a bullish relationship. However, their 
results were insignificant therefore it can be assumed that there is little association 
between short interest and stock returns. 
Aksu and Gunay (1995) searched for a causal relationship between short interest 
and stock prices. They used data compiled between January 1971 and December 1987. 
They employed a state space method in order to detect a relationship between short 
interest, stock prices and average trading volume. They found that stock prices are not 
co-integrated with short interest and average trading volume. Their results indicate that 
short interest and stock prices are not related with any other variable in their model nor 
are they related with one another. They claim that the inconsistent findings by other 
researchers are a result of the models that the other researchers used. The Aksu and 
Gunay state space model does not impose a priori any restrictions on the intercorrelations 
of the data. 
Current State of Short Selling - Summary and Conclusions 
The amount evidence that high short interest and high short interest ratios are 
bearish is greater than the evidence that high short interest and high short interest ratios 
are bullish. Seneca (1967, 1969) found that when short interest ratios are growing then 
the market is expected to decline. Figlewski (1981) found that low short interest stocks 
provide high excess returns, and high short interest stocks provide lower excess returns. 
Senchack and Starks (1993) conclude that a negative market reaction occurs around the 
announcement date for companies with a large unexpected increase in short interest. 
They also found that when options are available in a given stock, market restrictions on 
short selling encourage the use of options for speculation rather than short selling. Choie 
and Hwang (1994) found that issues with a large reported short position under perform 
the S&P 500 on average. A study by Albert, Smaby and Robison (1997) concluded that 
those issues with a large reported short position under perform the S&P 500 on average. 
They also find evidence of a small stock effect in short sales. Hanna (1968), the only 
study to conclude that short selling is bullish, found that investing in a portfolio of issues 
when their short interest was low and selling when short interest was high resulted in six 
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consecutive losses, investing in the portfolio when short interest was high and selling 
when it was low resulted in over 1,000 per cent hypothetical gains. 
However, general consensus of modern research into short selling is that short 
selling is unrelated to market prices. Kerrigan (1974) found that the use of the short 
interest ratios to predict advances and declines in particular issues is effective only to the 
extent that average daily volume, a component of the short interest ratio, is effective. The 
short interest volume component has no correlation with performance. Hurtado-Sanchez 
(1978) examined seven variants of short interest and found that short interest, regardless 
ofthe variants, does not affect current or future returns. Brent, Morse and Stice (1990) 
found that there is no relationship between changes in short interest and returns in 
subsequent months. Woolridge and Dickinson (1994) found only an insignificant 
relationship between the return on a firm's stock and short interest. Aksu and Gunay 
(1995) found using a state space model that stock prices are not co-integrated with short 
interest and average trading volume. 
This non-informationality of short selling is most likely a result of the increased 
regulatory vigilance that ended the era of the bear raid. The uptick rule is the primary 
method by which the act of short selling is separated from market prices. The uptick rule 
makes it impossible to short sell into falling prices. Thus it is impossible to drive a 
stock's price down through short selling alone. However, not only does the uptick rule 
end bear raids, it also introduces inefficiencies in the market. There is evidence from 
Hurtado-Sanchez (1978), Figlewski (1981), Senchack and Starks (1993) that the uptick 
rule prevents negative information from being processed as efficiently as positive 
information. This creates an upward bias in stock prices where the risk-return 
relationship is out of balance in some issues. 
Today's technology allows for efficient tracking of individual transactions. With 
the amount of information about particular sales that are available, plenty of evidence 
exists today with which to prosecute market manipulators that use short and distort 
schemes or bear raids. With firm justice and fair punishments, the threat of prosecution 
may be enough to prevent traders from participating in these types of activities. Short 
sale regulation may be unnecessary. 
-- 39 -
The SEC should consider easing short selling restraints by phasing out the uptick 
rule. First, the SEC should suspend the uptick rule except for situations where a firm's 
price has fallen below a designated market price floor or percentage of the opening price 
limit. Later, after observing the effects that the new regulation has on the markets and 
after testing for problem areas with the regulation, the SEC should consider abolishing 
the uptick rule altogether and rely on the threat of prosecution to deter market 
manipulators. This is done in many different areas today, including naked short selling. 
A mechanism does not exist to prevent naked short selling; it is merely outlawed, so that 
anyone participating in the practice opens himself or herself to punishment. 
The margin requirements for short selling are a quite normal form of monetary 
control. Relaxing margin requirements for short selling may improve the short selling 
function. Easing margin requirements would alleviate some of the financial cost of short 
selling and aid in correcting the inequity in the effects of negative information compared 
to positive information that the costs of short selling creates. The elimination of margin 
requirements in total is impractical, because short selling without margin requirements 
would technically allow free borrowing of unlimited amounts of money. The volatility 
caused by eliminating margin requirements would be unwelcome. 
Short selling provides several benefits that are often overlooked in common 
analysis ofthe short selling function. First, short selling helps cushion market declines. 
Since all short sellers are potential buyers of stock, short selling can prop up the market 
during a general decline. As short sellers attempt to cover their positions, they go to the 
market to buy stock. Often in general market downturns, short sellers are the only 
buyers. Second, short selling provides for liquidity in the markets that aids in the 
efficient processing of market information. Thirdly, short sellers are too often the first to 
identify companies committing their own form of market manipUlation through 
accounting fraud and other types of deceit. 
Short selling is a legitimate market function, and the practice of short selling 
provides observable and documented benefits to the market. Negative public opinion 
toward short selling is a result of a lack of education about its benefits. Freer short 
selling regulation can ensure that risk-return relationships are in balance and that 
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purchasers of a stock are getting the appropriate return - a return that is matches their 
expectations. 
There have been too many manipulative and fraudulent short selling schemes in 
the past to say that caution toward short selling is not warranted. Short selling has earned 
the bright orange jumpsuit of a convict through high profile bear raids in the past and the 
passing of misleading information to the public by short and distorters. However, short 
selling's past is not its present or its future. The tools exist to create a smooth running 
and well monitored environment in which an investor of any bent should be able to go 
about investing his money as he sees fit. The day of stringent short selling regulation is 
past; let the markets be free. 
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Purpose of the Study 
This study examines whether or not the release of short interest information 
triggers reaction in the prices of technology stocks. This reaction is measured in the 
sample in three tests to measure the effect of the release of short interest information 
according to short interest volume, short interest ratios and market value. These tests 
answer the question: is the level of short interest volume a predictor of future returns in 
technology stocks? 
Sampling and Data 
Our sample consists of stocks from the Dow Jones Technology Index (DJT!) that 
are listed on the NASDAQ. The DJT! consists of the following sectors: Computers, 
Diversified Technological Services, Internet, Software, Semiconductors, Office 
Equipment and Telecommunications. To be included in the sample a given stock must 
have had monthly short interest volume information available from January 1995 through 
September 2002. There are approximately 650 companies in the Dow Jones Technology 
index. One hundred and sixty one of those stocks are NASDAQ issues that have 
complete short volume information for the period tested. Approximately 145 of those 
stocks had complete CRSP data in a given month during the period tested. Short interest 
data was gathered from http://www.viwes.comlinvestlshorts/. All other data including 
daily price information was obtained from the CRSP file at the School of Business at Ball 
State University. Observations were taken daily from eighty-four monthly periods: 
January 1995 to December 2001. There are 12,600 total observations in the study (84 
months X approximately 145 companies (observations)/month). 
Methodology 
Daily returns from the CRSP file on each stock were compared to the expected 
returns generated using the capital asset pricing model (CAPM): 
Rexpected= Rnsk free+(Rmarket -Rnsk free)*J3Seta coefficient 
That is the expected return for given issue is the risk free rate (represented by the 
return on 90 day U.S. treasury bonds) plus the beta coefficient (risk of the firm compared 
to the market computed monthly from historical data) times the quantity market rate 
(represented by the value-weighted rate of return of the NASDAQ, NYSE and AMEX 
--
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markets as a whole) minus the risk free rate. The risk free rate, market rate and beta were 
all obtained from the CRSP data file. The expected return was then compared to the 
actual return for the stock. Actual return was computed with the formula: 
Ractual = (Pricet+ 1 - Pricet) / Pricet. 
Variation between the expected return and the actual return represents abnormal 
residual. The formula used to compute abnormal residuals is as follows: 
Aabnormal residual = Ractual- Rexpected + eerror term 
Negative abnormal residuals are important for the purposes of a short selling 
study. Negative abnormal residuals represent an unexpected positive return for the short 
seller. 
The abnormal residuals are accumulated daily, throughout a thirty-one day period 
where time zero is the twelfth day of a given month. The twelfth day was chosen because 
that is the day when the NASDAQ makes the prior month's short interest information 
available. The observations are grouped according to their relationship to the informed 
investors date: from fifteen days prior (-15) to the informed investors date (day 0), on day 
0, and to fifteen days after day 0 (+ 15). The abnormal residuals are summed across days 
(all day-14's are summed, all day-13's are summed and so on) and the stocks are 
summed together according to our criteria to arrive at the sum of the abnormal residuals 
(SUM) for a given group on a given day in our event study. When this information for a 
given day is divided by the number of periods (84) and the number of issues in the group 
it provides us with the abnormal returns (ARs) for a given group on a given day in the 
event study. 
In order to determine what time frames may be affected by the availability of 
short selling information, the ARs are accumulated over various time periods. These are 
referred to as cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs). One tailed T-statistics are 
used throughout the study to determine the significance ofthe ARs and the CARs 
First, the ARs for the entire sample of 31-day event study are examined in order 
to determine whether or not the availability of short selling information causes 
technology stocks to generate negative ARs. If short selling information does indeed 
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cause technology stocks to generate negative ARs, one would expect to see significant 
negative ARs after the short interest infonnation was released. 
Second, the CARs are examined to detennine whether persistent negative returns 
accumulate over several different periods of time. This study examines the following 
intervals: 
o to +1 
o to +5 
o to +7 
o to +9 
o to +10 
o to +11 
Third, the ARs and CARs are separated into deciles (ten groups) according to 
their short interest volume. These deciles are based on the previous months short interest 
data. If greater short interest volume causes significantly greater ARs and CARs over the 
infonned investors period one could conclude that greater short interest volume causes 
larger negative ARs. Thus the level of short interest volume would be a predictor of 
future returns. This infonnation could be used to create a profitable trading strategy. 
Fourth, the ARs and CARs are separated into deciles according to their short 
interest ratios. Once again, these deciles are based on the previous months short interest 
data. The short interest ratio allows the short interest volume to be controlled for the 
market volume of a given stock. Generally, stock with a larger market volume will have 
larger short interest volume as well, ceterus paribus. If larger short interest ratio deciles 
are found to generate significantly greater ARs and CARs over the infonned investors 
period one could conclude that greater short interest ratios are a predictor of future 
returns, as well. This could also be used to create a profitable trading strategy. 
Fifth, the ARs and CARs are separated into deciles according to their daily 
trading volume. Daily trading volume is a proxy for market value of the finn underlying 
the stock. Here, the study examines market value more closely to detennine whether 
high daily trading volume indicates greater future negative abnonnal returns, as well. 
Generally, stocks with larger market value have more infonnation available to the public 
and are more easily traded. 
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Results 
Significant negative ARs appear over the sample in several places. The days -14 
through -8 all show significant ARs: negative on days -14 through -12, -10 and -9; 
positive on days -11 and -8. Although not relevant to the purpose of this study, these 
results are nonetheless interesting because of their consistency. Abnonnal returns also 
appear close to the infonned investors date. Day -1 shows the largest significant positive 
AR for the event study. Day + 1 shows the largest negative AR for the event study. Both 
are significant at the 1 % level. The implication of these results are that it appears that 
there is a build up in stock price on the day prior to the release of short interest 
infonnation by NASDAQ, and then a release on day 1 of the infonned investors period. 
Significant ARs continue to appear throughout the remainder of the month. On day +6, 
the second largest negative ARs appear for the event study. Then on days +8 and + 13 
there are increasingly positive ARs. Days +9 and + 15 show decreasingly negative ARs. 
All the above-cited ARs are significant at the 1 % level. 
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Table 1: NYSE Technology Abnormal Residuals (ARs) and 
Cumulative Abnormal Residuals CARs 
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Chart 1: CARs and ARs Surrounding The Event Date 
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Chart 2: Size of Significant Abnormal Residuals 
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We see a pattern as illustrated in charts 1 and 2 of a build up of positive ARs prior 
to the event date, then a release of those ARs in the form of negative ARs in the informed 
investors period. 
Next, we examined the CARs over several intervals during the informed investors 
periods. Each ofthe CARs examined were negative with significance at the 1 % level. 
Table 2: CARs Over Selected Intervals 
Probability 
Interval CARs (t-Test) Significance 
o to +1 -0.0029675 0.0001 *** 
o to +5 -0.0027335 0.0042*** 
o to +7 -0.0058144 0.0001 *** 
o to +9 -0.0062413 0.0001 *** 
o to +10 -0.0071657 0.0001 *** 
o to +11 -0.0073266 0.0001 *** 
*Significant at 10% level 
**Significant at 5% level 
***Significant at 1 % level 
This illustrates that persistent negative ARs are generated after the release of short 
interest information on day o. The release of short interest information causes an 
unexpected negative reaction in NASDAQ technology stocks with reported short interest 
in a given month. 
Chart 3: CARs Over Selected Intervals 
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Next this study examines these CARs and selected ARs with the stocks grouped 
according to short interest volume deciles. The issues with the largest reported short 
interest volume for the prior month are grouped in decile 10, those issues with the 
smallest reported short interest volume for the prior month are grouped into decile 1. The 
rest of the issues are stratified accordingly into deciles 9 through 2. There appears to be a 
strong correlation between large short interest volume and negative ARs. Decile 10 has 
significant negative ARs at the 5% level on each of the dates examined 0, +1, and +9. On 
day + 1, deciles 9 through 6 have significant negative ARs at the 1 % level. On day +9, 
deciles 8, 7 and 6 have negative ARs at the 1 %, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
The CARs paint a more interesting picture. For days 0 through + 1 the largest five 
deciles have significant negative CARs. All but decile 7 are significant at the 1 % level. 
For days 0 through +7, deciles 7 through 5 have significant negative CARs at the 1 % 
level. For days 0 through + 11, deciles 9, 7, and 5, have significant negative CARs at the 
1 % level. Decile 8 has significant negative CARs at the 5% level as well. These results 
indicate that stocks with larger short interest volume generate significant negative CARs. 
These results favor the notion that high short interest triggers a negative response in stock 
pnces. 
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Table 3: Selected Average Abnormal Residuals and Cumulated Abnormal Residuals by Short Interest Decile 
1 = Lowest Short Interest Volume, 10 = Largest Short Interest V.-o"-I-'-um----=-e ___________ --, 
DAY 0 II DAY +1 II DAY +9 
Probability (t- Probability (t- Probability (t-
Decile Group ARs Test) Significance ARs Test) Significance ARs Test) 
10 -0.001961 0.0391 ** -0.002308 0.0117 ** -0.002404 0.0146 
9 -0.000079 0.9457 -0.003150 0.0050 *** -0.005151 0.0001 
8 0.000058 0.9639 -0.004807 0.0001 *** -0.002972 0.0171 
7 0.000710 0.5833 -0.004334 0.0006 *** -0.002421 0.0543 
6 -0.001797 0.2012 -0.003278 0.0097 *** 0.000544 0.6838 
5 -0.000271 0.8420 -0.003309 0.0144 ** -0.001594 0.2414 
4 0.000505 0.7044 -0.000990 0.4401 -0.000051 0.9724 
3 -0.001060 0.4145 -0.000767 0.5642 -0.001030 0.4620 
2 0.001546 0.2659 -0.003581 0.0057 *** 0.002917 0.1050 
1 -0.000546 0.7292 0.000094 0.9514 -0.002382 0.1385 
I DAYS (0, +1) II DAYS (0, +7) II DAYS(0,+11) 
Probability (t- Probability (t- Probability (t-
Decile Group CARs Test) Significance CARs Test) Significance CARs Test) 
10 -0.004269 0.0010 *** -0.003303 0.2143 
9 -0.003229 0.0001 *** -0.003321 0.2641 
8 -0.004750 0.0059 *** -0.005316 0.1301 
7 -0.003624 0.0461 ** -0.014368 0.0001 *** 
6 -0.005075 0.0099 *** -0.010607 0.0054 *** 
5 -0.003580 0.0579 * -0.011643 0.0028 *** 
4 -0.004851 0.7940 -0.001084 0.7644 
3 -0.001827 0.3170 -0.001829 0.5922 
2 -0.002035 0.2417 -0.005676 0.1189 
1 -0.000453 0.8223 0.001585 0.6905 
DAYS (+2, +7t II DAYS (+7, +11)A 
Decile Group CARs CARs 
10 0.000966 -0.002033 
9 -0.000093 -0.006609 
8 -0.000566 -0.003462 
7 -0.010745 -0.003536 
6 -0.005532 0.003954 
5 -0.008062 -0.004018 
( ( 
-0.005335 0.0957 
-0.009930 0.0057 
-0.008778 0.0353 
-0.017904 0.0001 
-0.006654 0.1579 
-0.015661 0.0009 
0.000248 0.9540 
-0.006159 0.1366 
-0.000851 0.8515 
0.002367 0.6219 
A Extrapolated 
from data 
above 
Significance 
** 
*** 
** 
* 
Significance 
* 
*** 
** 
*** 
*** 
( 
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Next this study examines these CARs and selected ARs with the stocks grouped 
according to short interest ratio deciles. This is important because short interest ratios 
control for size by dividing total shares shorted (total short interest) by the average daily 
volume for a given stock. Applying the same decile grouping procedures described in the 
last test, the results turned out rather unimpressive. The short interest ratio deciles 3 and 
5 had scattered significant ARs and CARs. However, no particular pattern emerged. 
When the residuals were separated into market value deciles, much the same 
pattern appeared as in the short interest volume decile test. On day 0, only deciles 9 and 
10 have significant negative ARs. On day + 1, a greater number of deciles (10 through 5) 
have significant negative ARs. On day +9, deciles 10 through 6 have significant negative 
ARs. 
The CARs grouped according to market value tell a similar tale. For days 0 
through + 1, deciles 10 through 8 have significant negative CARs at the 1 % level. For 
days 0 through +7, deciles 10 through 5 have significant negative CARs. Deciles 9 
through 7 are significant at the 1 % level; deciles 10, 6 and 5 are significant at the 5% 
level. Decile 1 has a significant positive CAR at the 5% level. 
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Table 4: Selected Abnormal Residuals and Cumulated Abnormal Residuals by Market Value Decile 
r--_______ ...:...1 _=-=L:..=.ow.:..:...=.:es::..:.t...:..:..:.;Market Value, 10 = Largest Market Value 
DAY 0 II DAY +1 II DAY +9 
Probability (t- Probability (t- Probability (t-
Decile Group AR Test) Significance AR Test) Significance AR Test) Significance 
10 -0.002331 0.0139 ** -0.003083 0.0010 *** -0.004439 0.0001 *** 
9 -0.002201 0.0679 * -0.005483 0.0001 *** -0.003117 0.0050 *** 
8 -0.000899 0.4205 -0.004768 0.0010 *** -0.004151 0.0001 *** 
7 0.001858 0.1260 -0.003189 0.0127 ** -0.003553 0.0070 *** 
6 0.001809 0.1437 -0.003396 0.0047 *** -0.003022 0.0127 ** 
5 0.000464 0.7142 -0.002910 0.0121 ** -0.000539 0.6566 
4 0.000699 0.6178 -0.001608 0.2020 -0.000165 0.8904 
3 -0.001037 0.4530 0.000229 0.8648 0.001840 0.1874 
2 0.000502 0.7424 -0.000924 0.5182 0.000835 0.6214 
1 -0.002260 0.2086 -0.001055 0.5554 0.000268 0.8929 
I DAYS (0, +1) II DAYS (0, +7) II DAYS (0, +11) 
Probability (t- Probability (t- Probability (t-
Decile Group CARs Test) Significance CARs Test) Significance CARs Test) Significance 
10 -0.005414 0.0001 *** -0.005929 0.0190 ** -0.011630 0.0001 *** 
9 -0.007684 0.0001 *** -0.008938 0.0036 *** -0.013676 0.0002 *** 
8 -0.005667 0.0004 *** -0.008608 0.0078 *** -0.013469 0.0005 *** 
7 -0.001332 0.4402 -0.009825 0.0053 *** -0.013345 0.0014 *** 
6 -0.001586 0.3507 -0.007230 0.0343 ** -0.009957 0.0186 ** 
5 -0.002445 0.1585 -0.007828 0.0271 ** -0.011508 0.0079 *** 
4 -0.000909 0.6328 -0.005774 0.1135 -0.005093 0.2402 
3 -0.000808 0.6694 -0.002349 0.5166 -0.000762 0.8617 
2 -0.000422 0.8350 -0.000345 0.9336 -0.001791 0.7255 
1 -0.003315 0.1483 0.001625 0.7239 0.012468 0.0287 ** 
I DAYS (+2, +7)A II DAYS (+7, +11t 
Decile Group CARs CARs A Extrapolated 
from data 
above 
10 -0.000515 -0.005701 
9 -0.001255 -0.004738 
8 -0.002941 -0.004861 
7 -0.008493 -0.003520 
6 -0.005644 -0.002726 
5 -0.005383 -0.003680 
( ( ( 
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Conclusions 
Three conclusions can be drawn from this study. First, given the results of the 
ARs of the technology index surrounding the informed investors date, on the day prior to 
the release of short interest information, NASDAQ technology stocks generate 
unexpected positive returns. On the date of the release of the short interest information, 
or the informed investors date, and the following day unexpected negative abnormal 
returns are generated. 
Second, short interest volume appeared to predict future abnormal returns. 
However, when short interest volume was controlled for market size, by grouping 
according to the short interest ratio, most significant ARs disappeared. A pattern of ARs 
does appear among the market value deciles, which follows closely to the pattern seen in 
the short interest volume groupings. This leads to the conclusion that the pattern in the 
short interest volume groupings appeared due to the fact that stocks with larger daily 
trading volume tend to have larger short interest volume for any given time period. 
Third, some conclusions can be drawn about the pattern that appears in the market 
value study. The negative CARs are larger in the short run for the larger stocks. 
However, in the long run the negative CARs for larger firms aren't as large or significant 
as those of the mid-to-Iarge stocks. It appears that the market processes negative 
information about stocks with the largest market value (deciles 9 and 10) over the short-
term, in the day following an announcement of short interest. However, it appears that 
negative information takes longer to process for stocks of mid-to-large market value. 
